

## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <a href="http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content">http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content</a>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

vague and somewhat incoherent kind. The author appears to best advantage in the more general discussions or when he is occupied with the direct exposition of Christian ideas and duties. In these chapters he says much that is valuable and suggestive. Indeed, throughout the book he leaves the impression of being more conversant with Christianity than philosophy. When his treatment becomes technical, as for instance, when he essays philosophical analysis or institutes comparison between different systems, his handling of the subject is sometimes feeble and inexact. As an instance of loose and inexact description a statement occurring on page 92, may be quoted. "This is the meaning of utilitarianism—an attempt to find in all virtue and regard for others latent or modified selfishness."

The composition betrays at times great carelessness and the book contains far too many involved and awkward sentences. The following statement, on pages 49, 50, about desire, shows how careless the writer can be about his sentences. "It is frequently used as though they (sic) were conflicting tendencies to action, considered apart for (sic) their relation to the person acting." On page 45 we find "cerebral con-commitant"; on page 66 "unrestricted from."

The book contains several indications here and there of having been hurriedly written. But even as it stands, it contains much that is sound and suggestive. A thorough revision, together with the excision of certain sections where the discussion is too brief and inadequate to be helpful would considerably enhance its value and usefulness.

W. Jenkyn Jones.

University College, Aberystwyth.

THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY. By Joseph Dietzgen, translated by Ernest Untermane, with an introduction by Dr. Anton Pannekock. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. vi, 444.

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF MIND AND MORALS. By M. H. Fitch. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. 266.

SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By Paul Lafargue. Chicago: Chas H. Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. 165.

These three books may conveniently be noticed together, as all are contributions to the interesting reformulation of philos-

ophy from a Marxian standpoint. The writers of all three are—pardon the phrase—exploiters of "the materialistic interpretation" of all things mundane, including those phantasms of the mind which have danced their way down the ages under the names of religion, metaphysics, and morality.

This particular materialistic interpretation, however, the reader must understand, is not the bourgeois materialism of the nine-teenth century evolutionists. Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, and all their kind lived still in the dark ages of individualism, and therefore failed to see that a true materialistic interpretation of the world really could not be formulated in terms of energy and molecules. The particular turtle on which the universe actually rests is property. The institution of private property, and its complement, wage slavery, gave birth to all of man's philosophical concepts, shaped his religious dogmas, and determined his morality.

That is to say, they did all these things after the days of primitive communion had gone by. If those days could have endured, man obviously would always have been a monist; but, of course, a non-rational, uncritical one. Knowing nothing of conflict in his economic life, he could have perceived no distinctions. Exchange and private property, however, introducing the distinction (empirical) between those who get too much, and those who don't get enough, made men aware of the dualism of good and bad, right and wrong, spirit and matter, in short, of being and not being. Started on this road, he had to bring up at Kant, Hegel, and Herbert Spencer.

It's a sorry tale, but the villain has been discovered, and happier days are in sight. Private property is doomed, and bourgeois philosophy will follow it into the outer darkness. Socialism and proletarian science will unify the body politic and the human soul, the latter being, as every one will clearly see, a function of collectivism. These three little books are harbingers of the new day.

Mr. Dietzgen offers us the thesis that "philosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal world wisdom, and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special investigation of the theory of understanding." Particular conclusions of its lucid labors are: "Modern psychologists have at last divined, if not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but a phenomenon." "It is the merit of philosophy to

have demonstrated that metaphysics is possible only as a fantastical speculation." These prepare us for the *denouement*, namely: "Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are subject to continuous perfection." "Stable motion, and mobile stability constitute the reconciling contradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions."

Mr. Fitch is less recondite than Mr. Dietzgen, but he gets nearer to the great common heart of proletarian man. His view of man "makes him a product of nature," and "the highest code of ethics will be based on this necessity of maintaining a rational correspondence with environment." Unfortunately, Mr. Fitch does not show us in detail the fundamental reality that nature is property, and that the environment to which man is to adjust himself must be made consistently Marxian.

This desideratum is supplied by M. Lafargue, who demonstrates that the God concept is a product and necessity of bourgeois existence, and by irresistible logic leads us up to the conclusion of the whole matter, to wit: "Ethics, like the other phenomena of human activity, is subject to the law of economic materialism formulated by Marx: The mode of production of the material life dominates in general the development of the social, political, and intellectual life."

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH: An Essay. By Harold H. Joachim, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906. Pp. 182.

THOUGHT AND THINGS: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought. Or, Genetic Logic. By J. Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., etc. Vol. I. Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1906. Pp. xiv, 273.

These two volumes may be taken as an indication of the growing interest in epistemology among English-speaking philosophers. It hardly falls within the scope of a journal of Ethics to give a critical account of such works; and it must suffice here to give a general indication of their nature. The work of Mr. Joachim is written from what may be broadly characterized as a Hegelian or Bradleyan point of view; and this gives it a